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Inefficiency of voting in Parrondo games
Abstract
We study a modification of the so-called Parrondo’s paradox where a large number
of individuals choose the game they want to play by voting. We show that it can
be better for the players to vote randomly than to vote according to their own
benefit in one turn. The former yields a winning tendency while the latter results
in steady losses. An explanation of this behaviour is given by noting that selfish
voting prevents the switching between games that is essential for the total capital
to grow. Results for both finite and infinite number of players are presented. It is
shown that the extension of the model to the history-dependent Parrondo’s paradox
also displays the same effect.
Key words: Parrondo’s paradox, Majority rule, Brownian ratchets
PACS: 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a, 87.23.Ge
1 Introduction
The dynamics of a flashing ratchet can be translated into a counterintuitive
phenomenon in gambling games which has recently attracted considerable
attention. It is the so-called Parrondo’s paradox [1,2,3] consisting of two losing
games, A and B, that yield, when alternated, a winning game.
In game A, a player tosses a coin and makes a bet on the throw. He wins or
loses 1 euro depending on whether the coin falls heads or tails. The probability
p1 of winning is p1 = 1/2 − ǫ with 0 ≤ ǫ ≪ 1; so game A is fair when ǫ = 0
and losing when ǫ > 0. By losing, winning, and fair games here we mean that
the average capital is a decreasing, increasing, and a constant function of the
number of turns, respectively.
The second game —or game B— consists of two coins. The player must throw
coin 2 if his capital is not a multiple of three, and coin 3 otherwise. The
probability of winning with coin 2 is p2 = 3/4 − ǫ and with coin 3 is p3 =
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No Yes
Game A Game B
  win  lose
1/2-ε
Is X(t) a multiple of three?
  win  lose
1/2+ε
  win  lose
3/4-ε 1/4+ε 1/10-ε 9/10+ε
Fig. 1. Rules of the two Parrondo games
1/10−ǫ. They are called “good” and “bad” coins respectively. It can be shown
that game B is also a losing game if ǫ > 0 and that ǫ = 0 makes B a fair game
[3,4]. The rules of both game A and B are depicted in fig. 1
Surprisingly, switching between games A and B in a random fashion or follow-
ing some periodic sequences produces a winning game, for ǫ > 0 sufficiently
small, i.e., the average of player earnings grows with the number of turns.
Therefore, from two losing games we actually get a winning game. This indi-
cates that the alternation of stochastic dynamics can result in a new dynamics,
which differs qualitatively from the original ones.
Alternation is either periodic or random in the flashing rachet and in the
paradoxical games. On the other hand, we have recently studied the case
of a controlled alternation of games, where information about the state of the
system can be used to select the game to be played with the goal of maximising
the capital [5]. This problem is trivial for a single player: the best strategy
is to select game A when his capital is a multiple of three and B otherwise.
This yields higher returns than any periodic or random alternation. Therefore,
choosing the game as a function of the current capital presents a considerable
advantage with respect to “blind” strategies, i.e., strategies that do not make
use of any information about the state of the system, as it is the case of
the periodic and random alternation. Also, in a flashing ratchet, switching
on and off the ratchet potential depending on the location of the Brownian
particle allows one to extract energy from a single thermal bath, in apparent
contradiction with the second law of thermodynamics [6]. This is nothing but
a Maxwell demon, who operates having at his disposal information about the
position of the particle; and it is the acquisition or the subsequent erasure
of this information what has an unavoidable entropy cost [7], preventing any
violation of the second law.
Whereas a controlled alternation of games is trivial for a single player, in-
teresting and counter-intuitive phenomena can be found in collective games.
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We have recently considered a collective version of the original Parrondo’s
paradox. In this model, the game —A or B— that a large number N of indi-
viduals play can be selected at every turn. It turns out that blind strategies are
winning whereas a strategy which chooses the game with the highest average
return is losing [5].
In this paper, we extend our investigation of controlled collective games consid-
ering a new strategy based on a majority rule, i.e., on voting. This type of rule
is relevant in several situations, such as the modelling of public opinion [8,9]
or the design of multi-layer neural networks by means of committee machines
[10,11]. We will show that, in controlled games, the rule is very inefficient: if
every player votes for the game that gives him the highest return, then the
total capital decreases, whereas blind strategies generate a steady gain. The
same effect can be found for the capital-independent games introduced in [4].
As mentioned above, for a single player, the majority rule does defeats the
blind strategies. The inefficiency of voting is consequently a purely collective
effect.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
the counter-intuitive performance of the different strategies. In Section 3 we
discuss and provide an intuitive explanation of this behaviour. In Sec. 4, we
analyse how the effect depends on the number of players. In Section 5, we
extend these ideas to the capital-independent games introduced in [4]. Finally,
in Sec. 6 we present our main conclusions.
2 The model
The model consists of a large number N of players. In every turn, they have to
choose one of the two original Parrondo games, described in the Introduction
and in fig. 1. Then every individual plays the selected game against the casino.
We will consider three strategies to achieve the collective decision. a) The ran-
dom strategy, where the game is chosen randomly with equal probability. b)
The periodic strategy, where the game is chosen following a given periodic se-
quence. The sequence that we will use throughout the paper is ABBABB . . .
since it is the one giving the highest returns. c) The majority rule (MR) strat-
egy, where every player votes for the game giving her the highest probability
of winning, with the game obtaining the most votes being selected.
The model is related to other extensions of the original Parrondo games played
by an ensemble of players, such as those considered by Toral [12,13]. However,
in our model the only interaction among players can occur when the collective
decision is made. Once the game has been selected, each individual plays, in a
3
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the capital per player in an infinite ensemble for ǫ = 0.005 and
the three strategies discussed in the text.
completely independent way, against the casino. Moreover, in the periodic and
random strategies there is no interaction at all among the players, the model
being equivalent to the original Parrondo’s paradox with a single player.
The MR makes use of the information about the state of the system, whereas
the periodic and random strategies are blind, in the sense defined above. One
should then expect a better performance of the MR strategy. However, it turns
out that, for large N , these blind strategies produce a systematic winning
whereas the MR strategy is losing. This is shown in figure 2, where the capital
per player as a function of the number of turns is depicted for the three
strategies and an infinite number of players (see Appendix A for details on
how to obtain fig. 2).
3 Analysis
How many players vote for each game? The key magnitude to answer this
question and to explain the system’s behaviour is π0(t), the fraction of players
whose money is a multiple of three at turn t. This fraction π0(t) of players
vote for game A in order to avoid the bad coin in game B. On the other hand,
the remaining fraction 1− π0(t) vote for game B to play with the good coin.
Therefore, if π0(t) ≥ 1/2, there are more votes for game A and, if π0(t) < 1/2,
then game B is preferred by the majority of the players.
Let us focus now on the behaviour of π0(t) for ǫ = 0 when playing both games
separately. If game A is played a large number of times, π0(t) tends to 1/3
because the capital is a symmetric and homogenous random walk under the
rules of game A. On the other hand, if B is played repeatedly, π0(t) tends to
5/13. This can be proved by analyzing game B as a Markov chain [3,4]. It is
also remarkable that, for π0(t) = 5/13, the average return when game B is
4
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Fig. 3. Schematic representation of the evolution of π0(t) under the action of game
A and game B. The prescription of the MR is also represented.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of π0(t) (left) and the capital per player (right) for N =∞, ǫ = 0
for the MR and random strategies. The MR chooses game B when π0 is below the
straight line depicted at 1/2 and game A otherwise.
played is zero.
Figure 3 represents schematically the evolution of π0(t) under the action of
each game, as well as the prescription of the MR strategy explained above.
Now we are ready to explain why the MR strategy yields worse results than
the periodic and random sequences.
We see that, as long as π0(t) does not exceed 1/2, the MR strategy chooses
game B. However, playing B takes π0 closer to 5/13, well below 1/2, and thus
more than half of the players vote for game B again. After a number of runs,
the MR strategy gets trapped playing game B forever. Then π0 asymptotically
approaches 5/13, and as this happens, game B turns into a fair game when
ǫ = 0. As a consequence, the MR will not produce earnings any more, as can
be seen in figure 4.
The introduction of ǫ > 0 turns game B into a losing game if played repeatedly.
Consequently, the MR strategy becomes a losing one as in figure 2. To over-
come this losing tendency, the players must sacrifice their short-range profits,
not only for the benefit of the whole community but also for their own returns
in the future. Hence, some kind of cooperation among the players is needed
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Fig. 5. Simulation results for the average capital per player for N = 10, 50, 100,
and 1000 players, ǫ = 0.005, and the three different strategies. The simulations have
been made over a variable number of realizations, ranging from 10000 realizations
for N = 1 to 10 realizations for N = 1000. Simulations for the random and periodic
strategies have been made with N = 100 players and averaging over 100 realizations.
For these blind strategies, the result does not depend on the number of players N .
to prevent them from losing their capital. A similar effect has been found by
Toral in another version of collective Parrondo’s games. There, sharing the
capital among players induces a steady gain [12]. In our case, the striking re-
sult is that no complex cooperation is necessary. It is enough that the players
agree to vote at random.
4 Finite number of players
In the previous analysis an infinite number of players has been considered.
Remarkably, for just one player the MR strategy trivially performs better
than any periodic or random sequence, since it completely avoids the use of
the bad coin. In this Section we analyse the crossover between the winning
behaviour for a small number of players and the losing behaviour when this
number is large.
Figure 5 shows numerical results of the average capital per player for an in-
creasing number of players ranging from 10 to 1000. One can observe that,
the larger the number of players, the worse the results for the MR strategy,
becoming losing for a number of players between 50 and 100.
The above discussion for an infinite ensemble allows us to give a qualitative
explanation. The difference between large and small N is the magnitude of
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the fluctuations of π0(t) around its expected value. If game B is chosen a large
number of times in a row, then the expected value of π0(t) is 5/13. On the
other hand, the MR selects B unless π0(t) is above 1/2. Therefore, for the MR
to select A, fluctuations must be of order 1/2 − 5/13 = 3/26 ≃ 0.115. For
N players, the fraction of players with capital multiple of three, π0(t), will
be a random variable following a binomial distribution, at least if B has been
played a large number of times in a row. If the expected value of π0(t) is 5/13,
fluctuations of π0(t) around this value are of order
√
5/13× 8/13× 1/N . Then,
fluctuations will allow the MR strategy to choose A if N ≃ 20. Far above this
value, fluctuations that drive π0(t) above 1/2 are very rare, and MR chooses
B at every turn. On the other hand, for N around or below 20, there is an
alternation of the games that can even beat the optimal periodic strategy.
We see that the MR strategy can take profit of fluctuations much better than
blind strategies, but it loses all its efficiency when these fluctuations are small.
We believe that this is closely related to the second law of thermodynamics.
The law prohibits any decrease of entropy only in the thermodynamic limit or
for average values. On the other hand, when fluctuations are present, entropy
can indeed decrease momentarily and this decrease can be exploited by a
Maxwell demon.
5 History dependent games
A similar phenomenon is exhibited by the games introduced in Ref. [4], whose
rules depend on the history rather than on the capital of each player. Game A
is still the same as above, whereas game B is played with three coins according
to the following table:
Before last Last Prob. of win Prob. of loss
t− 2 t− 1 at t at t
loss loss p1 1− p1
loss win p2 1− p2
win loss p2 1− p2
win win p3 1− p3
with p1 = 9/10− ǫ, p2 = 1/4− ǫ, and p3 = 7/10− ǫ.
Introducing a large number of players but allowing just a randomly selected
fraction γ of them to vote and play, the same “voting paradox” is recovered
for sufficiently small γ. Again, blind strategies achieve a constant growth of
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the average money of the players in the history-dependent games
for γ = 0.5, ǫ = 0.005 and three different strategies.
the average capital with the number of turns while the MR strategy returns
a decreasing average capital, as it is shown in figure 6.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that the paradoxical games based on the flashing ratchet
exhibit a counterintuitive phenomenon when a large number of players are
considered. A majority rule based on selfish voting turns to be very inefficient
for large ensembles of players. We have also discussed how the rule only works
for a small number of players, since in that case it is able to exploit capital
fluctuations.
The interest of the model presented here is threefold. First of all, it shows
that cooperation among individuals can be beneficial for everybody. In this
sense, the model is related to that presented by Toral in Ref. [13]. Since John
Maynard Smith first applied game theory to biological problems [14], games
have been used in ecology and social sciences as models to explain social
behaviour of individuals inside a group. Some generalizations of the voting
model might be useful for this purpose. For instance, it could be interesting to
analyse the effect of mixing selfish and cooperative players or the introduction
of players who could change their behaviour depending on the fraction of
selfish voters in previous turns.
Secondly, the effect can also be relevant in random decision theory or the the-
ory of stochastic control [15] since it shows how periodic or random strategies
can be better than some kind of optimization. In this sense, there has been
some work on general adaptive strategies in games related with Parrondo’s
8
paradox [16,17].
Thirdly, this model and, in particular, the analysis for N finite, prompts the
problem of how information can be used to improve the performance of a
system. In the models presented here, information about the fluctuations of
the capital is useful only for a small number of players, that is, when these
fluctuations are significant. It will be interesting to analyse this crossover in
further detail, not only in the case of the games but also for Brownian ratchets.
Work in this direction is in progress.
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A Evolution equations
In this Section we describe the semi-analytical solution of the model for an
infinite number of players, used to depict fig. 2. Let πi(t), be the fraction of
players whose capital at turn t is of the form 3n+ i with i = 0, 1, 2 and n an
integer number.
If game A is played in turn t, these fractions change following the expression
[4]:


π0(t+ 1)
π1(t+ 1)
π2(t+ 1)


=


0 1/2 + ǫ 1/2− ǫ
1/2− ǫ 0 1/2 + ǫ
1/2 + ǫ 1/2− ǫ 0




π0(t)
π1(t)
π2(t)


(A.1)
which can be written in a vector notation as:
−→π (t+ 1) = ΠA
−→π (t). (A.2)
Similarly, when B is played, the evolution is given by:
−→π (t+ 1) = ΠB
−→π (t) (A.3)
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with
ΠB =


0 1/4 + ǫ 3/4− ǫ
1/10− ǫ 0 1/4 + ǫ
9/10 + ǫ 3/4− ǫ 0


. (A.4)
Now we can write the evolution equation for each strategy. For the random
strategy:
−→π (t+ 1) =
1
2
[ΠA +ΠB]
−→π (t). (A.5)
For the periodic strategy (ABBABB..):
−→π (3(t + 1)) = Π2
B
ΠA
−→π (3t). (A.6)
Finally, with the MR strategy the ensemble plays game A if π0(t) ≥ 1/2 and
B otherwise. Therefore:
−→π (t+ 1) =


ΠA
−→π (t) if π0(t) ≥ 1/2
ΠB
−→π (t) if π0(t) < 1/2.
(A.7)
Notice that the MR strategy is the only one inducing a nonlinear evolution in
the population fractions. To calculate the evolution of the capital, we compute
the winning probability in each game:
pA
win
(t) =
1
2
− ǫ
pB
win
(t) =
1
10
π0(t) +
3
4
(1− π0(t))− ǫ. (A.8)
Finally, the average capital 〈X(t)〉 per player evolves as:
〈X(t+ 1)〉 = 〈X(t)〉+ 2pwin(t)− 1 (A.9)
and pwin(t) is replaced by p
A
win
(t) or pB
win
(t), depending on the game played at
turn t in each strategy.
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